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| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Elisa Magrì | vi |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2024-07-30T06:53:10Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2024-07-30T06:53:10Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2019 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | International Journal of Philosophical Studies. -2019. -No.2, Vol.27. -P.327-346 | vi |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://elib.hcmussh.edu.vn/handle/HCMUSSH/140370 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper reconsiders Heather Battaly’s argument that empathy is not a virtue. Like Battaly, I argue that empathy is a disposition that includes elements of virtue acquisition, but is not in itself a virtue in the Aristotelian sense.. | vi |
| dc.format.extent | 21 p. | vi |
| dc.language.iso | en | vi |
| dc.publisher | Taylor & Francis | vi |
| dc.subject | Empathy | vi |
| dc.subject | Respect | vi |
| dc.subject | Epistemic dignity | vi |
| dc.subject | Vulnerability | vi |
| dc.title | Empathy, Respect, and Vulnerability | vi |
| dc.type | Article | vi |
| Appears in Collections | Bài trích | |
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