Item Infomation
Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | David Papineau | vi |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2024-07-30T09:07:17Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2024-07-30T09:07:17Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2016 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | International Journal of Philosophical Studies. - 2016. - No.3, Vol. 24. - P. 324–347 | vi |
| dc.identifier.issn | 09672559 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://elib.hcmussh.edu.vn/handle/HCMUSSH/140392 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | It is very natural to suppose that conscious sensory experience is essentially representational... | vi |
| dc.format.extent | 25 p. | vi |
| dc.language.iso | en | vi |
| dc.publisher | Taylor & Francis | vi |
| dc.subject | Perception | vi |
| dc.subject | Representation | vi |
| dc.subject | Consciousness | vi |
| dc.title | Against representationalism (about conscious sensory experience) | vi |
| dc.type | Article | vi |
| Appears in Collections | Bài trích | |
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