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| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Raymond Auerback | vi |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2024-08-02T03:54:36Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2024-08-02T03:54:36Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2021 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | International Journal of Philosophical Studies. -2021. -No.4, Vol.29. -P.559–576 | vi |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://elib.hcmussh.edu.vn/handle/HCMUSSH/140601 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | In her book Epistemic Injustice: Power & the Ethics of Knowing, Miranda Frickerargues that there is a distinctly epistemic kind of injustice, which she calls testimonial injustice, resulting from identity-prejudicial credibility deficit – identity prejudic causing a hearer to give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker’s word... | vi |
| dc.format.extent | 19 p. | vi |
| dc.language.iso | en | vi |
| dc.publisher | Taylor & Francis | vi |
| dc.subject | Testimony | vi |
| dc.subject | Prejudice | vi |
| dc.subject | Injustice | vi |
| dc.subject | Virtue theory | vi |
| dc.title | Just How Testimonial, Epistemic, Or Correctable Is Testimonial Injustice? | vi |
| dc.type | Article | vi |
| Appears in Collections | Bài trích | |
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